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Book Reviews
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. By David T. 
Moore. Washington, D.C.; Joint Military Intelligence College 
Press, 2006. Maps. Figures and Tables. Notes. Sources cited.
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis is Occasional Paper Number 
Fourteen published by the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This series of Occasional Papers deals 
with significant issues in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and is sup-
ported by JMIC through its Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. 
This work builds on earlier publications in the same series dealing with 
analytic methodology in the U.S. IC.
The author, David T. Moore, is a senior intelligence analyst and technical 
director at the National Security Agency (NSA). Serving in assignments 
both abroad and in the Washington, D.C. area for more than two decades, 
Moore has developed expertise in the areas of intelligence analysis com-
petencies, methods, and standards, and has been an advocate for best 
practices in intelligence through creative insights into analytic methodol-
ogy. His methods have been tested for practicality in several training and 
educational courses throughout the U.S. IC.
The central theme of this work is the need for analysts throughout the 
U.S. IC to be better trained in various critical thinking methods and to put 
their training to use in more effective ways. The shortfall in intelligence 
analysis in the U.S. IC in the last half-century, according to Moore, has 
been the analysts' persistent reliance upon their own (or their agencies') 
presuppositions, assumptions, and biases. Moore's argument is that this 
pattern of analysis has resulted in a number of intelligence failures and 
has not encouraged analysts to think "outside the box." According to 
Moore, for analysts in the IC to be most effective, they need an "overarch-
ing, reflective framework to add structured reasoning to sound, intuitive 
thinking" (1).
Moore first illustrates this point by defining three types of reasoning—
inductive, deductive, and abductive—and how these three reasoning pro-
cesses trace the development of analytic beliefs along different paths. 
While Moore argues that analysts who use these reasoning processes 
stand to be the most persuasive, he still warns that fallacious reasoning or 
mischaracterization in any of the three methods can affect reasoning 
using the others. Moore then defines critical thinking and its application 
in intelligence analysis, using the definition set forth by Richard Paul and 
Linda Elder of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. According to Paul 
Williamson et al.: Book Reviews
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009Journal of Strategic Security
68
and Elder, critical thinking is "the mode of thinking in which the solitary 
thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking 
charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual 
standards on them" (8).
Moore argues that when the correct questions and related alternative 
explanations are not fully considered, intelligence failures occur. He uses 
the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study to demonstrate how preconceived 
notions about the presence of foreigners in Cuba in the summer of 1962 
led to several missteps in the handling of the crisis by the fall of 1962. 
Moore effectively reasoned that the lack of critical thinking strategies 
used to evaluate the events leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis had a 
significant impact on how the U.S. responded to the incident. Analysts at 
that time instead relied upon preconceived notions of the value of 
HUMINT being reported from Cuba. Moore warns that these fallacies can 
also be capitalized upon by an adversary for deception purposes, and were 
effectively employed to some degree by the Cubans and Soviets in this 
situation.
Moore also cites another area in which critically thinking analysts can 
have a significant impact in the IC and U.S. foreign policy—with policy-
makers. According to Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, who wrote 
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, analogy is a 
tool commonly used by policymakers. Moore reasoned that critically 
thinking analysts might add substantively to the policymakers' options by 
"constructively challenging the tendency to rely upon analogy as a way of 
addressing situations" (35).
For much of the rest of the paper, Moore continues to define critical 
thinking strategies, their importance in the IC framework, and how the IC 
needs to further its efforts to incorporate critical thinking training into the 
development of its analysts. He outlines the poor record of implementing 
critical thinking training throughout the IC and provides suggestions on 
how to remedy that so IC analysts will have the right tools to review a 
broad spectrum of intelligence information in a rapidly-changing envi-
ronment. According to Moore, with the proper training, IC analysts will 
be better able to synthesize intelligence using different strategies as 
opposed to relying solely on intuitive thinking, which inherently leads to 
biases and preconceived mindsets. He describes the critical thinking 
course currently utilized by NSA and touts it as a good model to follow.
Overall, this paper serves as a valuable tool for senior IC officials who will 
formulate and develop future training programs for IC analysts. Moore 
cites examples for implementation of training and at the end of the paper 
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provides exercises and activities for use in a classroom setting. The paper 
would possibly prove more useful to more inexperienced analysts in the 
IC if Moore would provide a further breakdown of the actual critical 
thinking methods, and practical examples of how to apply those princi-
ples in real-life intelligence situations, as he illustrated with the Cuban 
Missile Crisis case study. With that said, though, this paper likely serves 
as a fitting complement to the other papers in the series and should be 
utilized as part of JMIC training.
Christine E. Williamson is an Intelligence Analyst for the U.S. Air Force.
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At The Center Of The Storm: The CIA During America's Time of 
Crisis. By George Tenet with Bill Harlow. New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2007 (first paperback edition published in 
2008). ISBN: 978-0-06-114779-1 (paperback). Photographs. 
Glossary. Index. Pp. xxii, 561. $16.95.
It is difficult to specify whether this is a biography or a history. Certainly it 
is one person's view of actions and reactions that significantly changed 
America's world. George Tenet had been a U.S. Senate staffer and a part 
of the National Security Council (NSC) staff before being appointed as the 
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1995. He 
became the Director in 1997, and served in that position until 2004, 
under the William J. Clinton and then the George W. Bush administra-
tions. A lot of world events happened during his years with the CIA that 
directly affected the United States and how we conduct our daily lives, 
and that necessitated changes in U.S. Government structure and respon-
sibilities. His account of his days with the CIA and world events in that 
period provide the reader with insights as to how some decisions were 
and were not made, at least from the perspective of someone at the senior 
level of America's Intelligence Community (IC).
While one might expect that the author would try to justify things that 
occurred and that, retrospectively, might have been done better or differ-
ently, Tenet seems to make every effort to be fair-minded in his descrip-
tions of actions and decisions, and indeed takes the blame for some of the 
things that went wrong during the period. To me, this is not an effort to 
provide a rationale for actions taken during this turbulent period. Rather, 
it is an insightful view of some of the day-to-day activities that took place. 
It is also an insightful view of the IC and how it operates.
In the preface of the book, Tenet makes his objectives clear: "This memoir 
relies on my recollection of a tumultuous period in our nation's life. No 
such undertaking is completely objective, but it is as honest and unvar-
nished as I can make it." A bit further he states that "this is the story of 
how we saw the threat, what we did about it, what was proposed and not 
done, how our thinking evolved, and why the men and women of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency were ready with a plan of action to respond force-
fully to the loss of three thousand American and foreign lives" (3).
The structure of the book follows the early days of his work at CIA, includ-
ing the normal day-to-day activities, the events of September 11, 2001, the 
preparation for and conduct of the war in Afghanistan, and the prepara-
tion for and initiation of the war in Iraq, and concludes with a compre-
hensive afterword and postscript summarizing the book.
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In Tenet's early days at the CIA, the Agency, as well as many other govern-
ment organizations, were undergoing funding reductions and reduced 
hiring. He demonstrates how good leadership under these adverse condi-
tions can modify or alleviate some of the associated stresses. He describes 
his focus on the value of the employees and how a leader must earn their 
trust, providing leadership from "the perspective of the glass being always 
half-full" (4). A clear indicator of his leadership attitude was the fact that 
on most days while he was Director he ate lunch in the main cafeteria at 
the CIA, not in an executive dining room.
Tenet takes an incisive look at events and situations leading up to 
September 2001, including those he labels as "missed opportunities" 
(191). In his words, he treats this view not as what could have stopped the 
attacks but in the context of several "what ifs" that could have delayed 
them or reduced the effects. He also notes some of the intelligence 
collected that indicated the imminence of an al-Qaida attack, but no clear 
indicators of the specific targets. Based on some of these indicators some 
actions were taken, but they were not always popular. Even shortly after 
September 11, when the IC assumed that this was only the first wave of a 
series of attacks, a program that increased intelligence collected by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) against foreign terrorists that were 
suspected of planning new attacks on the U.S. was vilified as "domestic 
spying."
Concerning the build-up to the Afghanistan war and the Iraq invasion 
Tenet cites many of the conflicts and even misunderstandings that devel-
oped among the many elements involved: the FBI, the CIA, members of 
Congress, the Pentagon, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of 
the President. The author elaborates on the conditions surrounding areas 
of potential concern that might bear on the decisions to initiate attacks. 
For example, he provides more background to consider concerning the 
uproar following his use of the phrase "slam dunk" which, according to 
him, was not an expression to support the president's decision to remove 
Saddam Hussein and launch the Iraq war. Rather, Tenet maintains that 
the exclamation was in response to a question as to whether more infor-
mation regarding Iraq could be declassified and released in order to bet-
ter debate the issues at hand (362). Also significant among these concerns 
and misunderstandings were the facts surrounding al-Qaida associations 
with Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the famous sixteen 
words, "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein 
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa," which 
appeared in the president's State of the Union speech early in 2003 (449).
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As interesting and fact-filled as the twenty-five chapters of the main text 
are, the last two sections are even more fascinating. The afterword sums 
up much of the content and the rationale that Tenet has expressed, and 
the postscript, written in February 2008, a year after the first publication, 
includes his perspective as influenced by later events. In the afterword, he 
notes that "first and foremost, it must be said that intelligence is not the 
sole answer to any complicated problem. Often, at best, only sixty percent 
of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable" (490). 
Further in that chapter he discusses the practicality of a surge in military 
forces in Iraq—at the time of the writing the surge had not taken place—
and he is not especially optimistic about its outcome. Consistent with the 
rest of the book, in the afterword he enforces the need for commitment to 
fighting "the global challenge of terrorism" as a worldwide problem, not 
focused exclusively on Afghanistan, Iraq, or specific terrorist groups 
(496).
A significant theme in the postscript is the potential for nuclear attack: 
"The intelligence is clear and compelling that al-Qaida has the intent to 
attack our homeland with a yield-producing nuclear bomb" (509). 
Regarding this he expresses his hope that the book will "spark discussion 
leading to strategic and tactical plans to address the threat of nuclear 
weapons in the hands of terrorists" (513).
This book will certainly be of real interest to those who are in or familiar 
with the intelligence business, as it is filled with behind-the-scenes activi-
ties as seen by the Director of the CIA. In addition, all of us who lived 
through September 11 and have concerns about America's future and 
safety will find this a worthwhile read.
Ed Urie is a member of the Henley-Putnam University faculty and is also 
an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He is a retired U.S. 
Army Intelligence Officer and a veteran of CIA and NSA.
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Female Suicide Bombers. By Rosemarie Skaine. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006. ISBN: 978-0-7846-2615-7 
(paperback). Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. 
Index. Pp. vii, 172. $35.00.
Until I read Female Suicide Bombers, I had no idea how many deaths 
have been attributed to suicide attackers. Even more amazing was the 
percentage of female suicide attackers. Female Suicide Bombers investi-
gates how women have become combatants in armed conflicts throughout 
the world. Its pages are filled with very useful and interesting statistics. 
Rosemarie Skaine does a wonderful job of categorizing and detailing 
female suicide bombers in our society.
The book starts out by discussing the history of suicide bombing. Skaine 
provides a chronological analysis dating back to the first century when 
Jewish Sicaris used suicide bombers, up through and including bin 
Laden's September 11 attacks in New York City. Subsequent chapters 
cover relevant information including why women are used as bombers, 
the effects of terror on society, and the tactics used by female suicide 
bombers. Skaine also cites numerous conflicts throughout the world 
where females have been used as suicide bombers. For example, in 1991, 
Dhanu, a Sri Lankan Tamil, became the first Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) female suicide bomber. On May 21, 1991, Dhanu detonated 
an explosive vest that killed India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Other 
conflicts brought out in this book include the Chechen-Russian and the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflicts.
Female Suicide Bombers also discusses United States domestic security 
and foreign policies regarding terrorism. Skaine examines several con-
gressional initiatives that enable this country to defend itself from terror-
ism. The first is the Patriot Act, which enhances law enforcement 
investigatory tools and strengthens the United States' measures to pre-
vent and detect money laundering. A second initiative is the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security. In November 2002, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security was established, which protects the country 
from attacks on U.S. soil. It strengthens computer security as well as 
Internet surveillance.
Included in the same chapter that covers domestic security and foreign 
policies is a discussion on new strategies and approaches taken by the 
United States against terrorism. I found this chapter to be most informa-
tive. The author quotes retired General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme 
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Allied commander of NATO, as saying: "To win this war, we must defeat 
the ideology of terrorism, depriving angry young people of their ability to 
justify their hateful actions in the name of Allah" (159).
In addition to the United States providing leadership, diplomacy, and mil-
itary intervention to combat terrorism, Skaine writes that we must also 
cut off terrorist activities by drying up their financial support. Terrorists 
do not write a check for items needed to carry out their mission. Terrorist 
organizations deal with large sums of money, which originate out of crim-
inal activity. In order for the United States to make a dent in the War on 
Terror, we must stop the flow of money to these organizations.
The last topic that Skaine covers in her book is preparedness and training. 
It goes beyond saying that the world needs to be more prepared for the 
next terrorist attack. This is especially true in responding to the threat 
from female suicide bombers.
The book was well researched and easy to read. It would be very useful for 
anyone interested in intelligence, counterterrorism studies, and strategic 
security. In my opinion, Rosemarie Skaine's book, Female Suicide 
Bombers is a must for your library.
Michael Savasta is a member of the Henley-Putnam University faculty 
and is also an adjunct faculty member at Broward College. He is a police 
detective with twenty-eight years experience and a former USAF SPI 
officer.
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Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice. By 
Christopher Paul, Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2008. ISBN: 978-0-275-99591-1. Acronyms/
Abbreviations. Charts. Diagrams. Photographs. Glossary. 
Notes. Sources cited. Appendix. Pp. ix, 175. $55.00.
Information Operations (IO) is probably the most misunderstood opera-
tional capability in the Department of Defense (DoD). Each of the military 
services, the various offices working IO at the joint level, and DoD have 
their own conceptual understanding of how IO should operate on the bat-
tlefield. For at least ten years, these entities have battled over how to 
define the discipline, what to include in the doctrine, and how to conduct 
IO on the battlefield. Too many times leaders overlook IO as a formal 
operational capability, but then may unwittingly include it in battle with-
out knowing they are conducting IO. Information Operations: Doctrine 
and Practice, by Christopher Paul is a move in the right direction for 
helping provide clarity within the IO discipline and shedding light on how 
all the IO components can work together, as well as what IO's role should 
be in peacetime as well as wartime.
Paul states that his intention in writing the book was primarily for its use 
as a reference tool, which is exactly what anyone involved in military 
operations, specifically IO, currently needs. This book is an excellent 
resource for anyone currently working in, or who may be assigned to, any 
one of the IO capabilities in the future. Paul is an academician in his train-
ing and education, a social scientist to be precise, with a Ph.D. in Sociol-
ogy from UCLA. He works in Philadelphia's RAND office with current 
research interests in military influence operations, integration of air and 
naval forces, simulation training, press-military relations, counterterror-
ism, and military operation on urban terrain.
In his book, Paul consistently states that IO should be part of a coordi-
nated and synchronized effort between multiple government agencies, of 
which the Department of Defense is only one facet. The book outlines 
three core IO themes: (1) the need to integrate and coordinate IO with 
higher-level U.S. Government information efforts; (2) the tension 
between capabilities concerned with information content [PSYOP, 
OPSEC, and MILDEC] and those concerned with information systems 
[EW and CNO]; and (3) the tension between capabilities employing 
"black" content and those that employ only "white" information. Black 
content includes those capabilities that are used that do not tell the entire 
truth or purposefully tell a lie to hide true intentions. White content can 
be thought of as what public-affairs personnel are responsible for: telling 
the truth. Paul states: "There are many ways that 'mixing the liars and the 
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truth tellers in one pot' brings grief" (118), which is one of the arguments 
that public affairs personnel have with IO when it comes to writing doc-
trine: they do not want to be associated with the deceptive aspects of IO.
Information Operations casts a large shadow that many on the opera-
tional side of the Department of Defense either like to ignore, or like to 
claim they do not have the technical knowledge to understand the con-
cepts associated with IO. Too many times leaders responsible for one of 
the many facets of IO state that they are sure glad their subordinates 
understand this stuff because they sure don't! Paul points out this prob-
lem and quotes Christopher Lamb's observation of lessons learned during 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 (OIF 2), stating that "a major problem 
documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners 
did not adequately understand PSYOP and thus failed to appreciate its 
capabilities sufficiently or employ them appropriately and effectively" 
(52). One could replace the word PSYOP in this sentence with any of the 
other IO core capabilities, supported capabilities, or related capabilities 
and still suffer from the same outcome. A major problem with IO military 
assignments is assigning personnel to IO positions without the person 
having an understanding of IO concepts, leading to the compounded 
problem that even IO personnel do not understand IO. Paul's book helps 
those without a degree or technical background in any of the IO areas 
understand how to integrate the IO capabilities into operational military 
strategies.
One problem area noted in the book is that in chapter one, Paul does an 
excellent job of explaining how the executive level of government needs to 
dictate the strategic information objectives, but then the rest of the book 
lays out IO in the military environment and deals with the execution of IO 
in the IO cell at the joint level of the military. Since he stated there is a 
need for the executive level to coordinate IO efforts, it would have been 
nice to read more on how those at the federal level should carry out that 
endeavor. Of course, maybe that could be a follow-on book intended for 
those in the federal level of government who work on shaping perceptions 
of society.
Paul's chapter "Contemporary Information Operations" provides an 
excellent overview of IO at the joint level of the military, from highlights 
of the relevant IO doctrine to diagrams and charts depicting an IO cell 
and IO cell chief functions. If readers are not familiar with how IO is orga-
nized in the U.S. military before reading the book, they will have a clear 
understanding of the environment, at least at the joint level, after reading 
the book.
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The heart of the book, though, lies in chapters three through five, where 
Paul breaks IO down into three areas: information content (psychological 
operations, military deception, and operations security), information sys-
tems (electronic warfare and computer network operations), and related 
military capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military 
support to public diplomacy). In each chapter, Paul describes the capabil-
ity in general terms, then specifically describes it as it relates to IO with 
the tools and capabilities listed. Finally, he identifies the challenges each 
capability faces. These three chapters are probably the most valuable por-
tion of the book since the reader who has a limited understanding of one 
IO area can refer to the appropriate section and begin to comprehend how 
the capability can be used for effect in a comprehensive operational IO 
campaign.
In the final chapter, Paul looks toward the future of IO and provides sug-
gestions on how to reorganize IO to minimize the tensions between infor-
mation content and information systems, and black content from white 
content. An important concept stressed is that everyone in the U.S. Gov-
ernment contributes to shaping the perceptions of the adversary. The 
actions of an E-1 Army private may have a tremendous influence in shap-
ing an adversary's perception since the private may have face-to-face con-
tact with an adversarial population.
Paul also makes realistic suggestions for reorganizing IO to separate the 
content-based capabilities from the systems-based capabilities. He sug-
gests that both EW and CNO be in a systems organization and PSYOP, 
MILDEC, PA and CMO be in a content organization. Of course, this would 
create the problem with mixing the black and white contents together so 
he suggests separating the white and black parts of PSYOP and marrying 
the white part with PA and the black part with MILDEC. He further sug-
gests changing the names so there are no residual associations with 
former capabilities. Paul concludes that there are further challenges to IO 
that may present future problems, but separating content from systems 
and black from white is a good start to solving some of the current issues 
facing the discipline.
Robin L. Thompson, D.M. is a former Air Force IO specialist and is cur-
rently an adjunct professor at Henley-Putnam University.
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The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security 
Agency. By Matthew M. Aid. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 
2009. ISBN: 978-1-59691-515-2. Photographs. Notes. Sources 
cited. Index. Pp. 424. $30.00
The National Security Agency (NSA) wears many hats, but its primary 
role is two-fold: first, it breaks the cryptologic codes of foreign govern-
ments and their militaries and feeds this information to policymakers 
responsible for guiding the foreign relations of the United States; second, 
NSA develops specialized technology that ensures foreigners cannot break 
into coded U.S. communications, either government or military. Matthew 
M. Aid provides extensive coverage of the politics and necessity leading to 
the creation of the NSA. He starts with U.S. cryptologic efforts during the 
Second World War and traces NSA's successes as well as failures up to the 
present day.
Although there are intelligence disappointments mercilessly revealed 
throughout the book, in the end one cannot help but believe that even this 
skeptical author has gained respect for NSA's contributions. During the 
Eisenhower administration, NSA learned that the Russians were prepar-
ing to move troops into Poland, and that Israel, with British and French 
support, was planning to attack Egypt. Prior to the invasion of Hungary, 
NSA detected Soviet troop movements. During the Kennedy administra-
tion, NSA confirmed North Vietnam was controlling Viet Cong activities 
in the south. In another part of the world, NSA tapped into the Cuban 
national telephone system and developed intelligence uncovering Soviet 
activities there that played a crucial role in resolving the Cuban Missile 
crisis.
By the time of the Johnson Administration in 1964, NSA was intercepting 
and reporting regularly on North Vietnamese naval communications. The 
author describes in detail the role of intelligence during the Gulf of 
Tonkin affair, and the self-serving "cherry picking" of available intelli-
gence by policymakers. Much intelligence during the war came from NSA 
reading of diplomatic traffic from other countries, instead of from inter-
cepted Vietnamese communications, which remained secure, except for 
low-level cipher systems. In response, NSA refined the art of "traffic anal-
ysis," the derivation of intelligence from monitoring communications pat-
terns without being able to read the content of the messages. Warning of 
the Tet Offensive came this way.
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By 1972, NSA had broken the communications codes of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, and helped deter planned terrorist attacks against 
Israelis in New York City. It played a crucial role in providing intelligence 
to President Ford during the Panama Canal negotiations.
Aid's coverage of NSA history continues to more current events, but grad-
ually with fewer facts and more speculation. Considerably less informa-
tion is available concerning events such as the Persian Gulf wars, the 
invasion of Iraq, and the situation in Afghanistan.
Aid also points out that not all intelligence was used properly. There is 
ample coverage of NSA warnings being ignored. For example, CIA intelli-
gence analysts rejected its warnings that Egypt and Syria were preparing 
to attack Israel in 1973. NSA had also picked up advanced warning of the 
Soviet military move against Czechoslovakia in 1968, even though the CIA 
continued to insist no invasion would take place. There are many such 
examples in the book.
The author also reviews what we know about several major disasters suf-
fered by NSA, such as the unprovoked Israeli attack on NSA's ship Liberty 
in which thirty-four crew members were killed, including twenty-five NSA 
civilian cryptologists. Israel claimed the attack was an accident, but inter-
cepts of radio traffic confirm the attack was intentional. The author notes 
that the NSA will not release the intercepts, presumably to cover up for 
the Israelis.
The Secret Sentry is a serious history of NSA. By reviewing the volumi-
nous footnotes at the end of the manuscript, one can get a sense of the 
remarkable amount of research behind this work. A great amount of 
material is taken from the National Archives but there are hundreds of 
references to original documents never published, but reviewed by the 
author. In addition, there is a large amount of information obtained 
through the Freedom of Information Act and from numerous recordings 
from the NSA Oral History project in the Center for Cryptologic History.
Another notable aspect of the book is how the author covers the extreme 
sensitivity of NSA's work, and the terrible consequences when its secrets 
are revealed. For example, in 1971, Jack Anderson reported that NSA 
could listen to Politburo telephone calls. As a result of his arrogant and 
stupid act, the U.S. embassy was given a bath in high-energy microwave 
bombardments, and this vital source of intelligence dried up completely. 
Most readers will recall how irresponsible reporting by the New York 
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Times revealed that Usama bin Ladin's cell phone was being tapped. He 
never used a phone again. Aid provides many such examples, and they 
should serve as a warning to everyone.
Anyone who studies The Secret Sentry will come away with awe and 
appreciation for the amazing accomplishments of the NSA. It truly is one 
of the most remarkable institutions in the U.S. Government or anywhere. 
The people who work there sign up for a life of obscurity, never to be pub-
licly appreciated. What it does require is incredible ingenuity and brain-
power, yet by the time its deeds are recognized, the persons involved are 
either dead or long retired.
In covering this important institution, Matthew M. Aid is very much dis-
tinguished from other writers. This reviewer has read more or less all of 
the published books (in English) about the NSA. The Secret Sentry is 
among the very best.
Edward M. Roche is a Professor of Intelligence Technologies at Henley-
Putnam University.
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The Blood of Lambs: A Former Terrorist's Memoir of Death 
and Redemption. By Kamal Saleem with Lynn Vincent, New 
York, NY: Howard Books, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-4165-7780-5. 
Appendixes. Notes. Pp.xi, 340. $23.99.
Kamal Saleem, the son of a Lebanese blacksmith, learned at his mother's 
table that the most sinful Muslim man can redeem himself with one drop 
of an infidel's blood. This lesson and others from Saleem's accounts of his 
violent and hate-filled life as a terrorist are the foundation of an excellent 
book. As the title of The Blood of Lambs suggests, the book exposes the 
violence of the young and impoverished who are recruited by radical 
Islam.
Saleem was forced to leave school and begin work at the age of six. But 
despite his abbreviated formal education, and with the able assistance of 
Lynn Vincent, his co-author, Saleem delivers a fascinating life story that is 
full of lessons to complacent and too-trusting Americans.
The chief lesson is that America has an enemy within her walls—radical 
Islam—and does nothing about it. Saleem is qualified to make this assess-
ment because at one time he was such an enemy. A corollary lesson is the 
frequent use of al toquiah—lying to enemies for the sake of Islam—that is 
frequently illustrated by the behavior of Saleem and his fellow Islamic 
radicals. The deception formerly practiced by Saleem is now turned 
against him by "moderate" Muslims in the United States who claim that 
Saleem is a liar and seeking to provoke prejudice against a peaceful people 
and their religion.
Saleem started down the path of radical Islam at a young age. Going to 
work at a job across town, Saleem, a Sunni Muslim, was beaten by three 
different groups of bullies—Armenians, Kurds, and Shiites—the last of 
which literally chased him into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. It 
was a life-changing event. Saleem instantly was granted not just care for 
his wounds and reassurance, but more importantly, protection. It was not 
the kind of protection that involved calling the police or the bully's par-
ents. Saleem witnessed the fear and awe that the Muslim Brotherhood 
inspired among its neighbors as its members visited each group responsi-
ble for terrorizing the six-year-old now under the protective wing of the 
Brotherhood. Later in life, Saleem came to see the Muslim Brotherhood as 
the lifeblood of Islamic terrorism and a "Muslim imitation of European 
fascism" (69).
Soon Saleem was a member of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), which sent him on his first mission at age seven 
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smuggling weapons into Israel. The description of the training for that 
mission and its execution, and other missions he carried out as a youth 
and teenager, fill much of the first third of the book and provide insight 
into the ease with which an unending supply of Islamic fighters are 
recruited and used.
Pages turn quickly while reading accounts of Saleem's growing up as an 
Islamic fighter that are interspersed with chapters of his current life as a 
former terrorist speaking about the dangers of radical Muslims both alone 
and as a member of "The Three Ex-Terrorists" (Walid Shoebat and Zaka-
riah Anani are the other two former Muslim terrorists). The life of a 
former Muslim speaking out against radical Islam (Saleem converted to 
Christianity following a severe accident) is not without danger. The con-
stant threats and protective measures take their toll, as evidenced by a 
panic attack of his teenage daughter and the anxiety he and his wife expe-
rience when threatened.
One account that will interest intelligence and counterterrorism 
professionals is Saleem's recruitment by an American for duty in Saudi 
Arabia. Seeking to escape the Lebanese Civil War, Saleem was hired by an 
American company that seemed to go to extraordinary lengths to employ 
him. Saleem became the manager of a recreational village in Saudi Arabia 
at a large salary, and in relatively short order became the operator of a 
"honey trap" operation as the American company brought in women 
under the guise of nurses, clerks, and technicians who were really 
dancers, escorts, and sex workers. Saleem's employer sought to supply 
pleasures to the Saudis to gain a business advantage and to influence 
Saudi-American relations. Saleem outfitted the rooms with cameras and 
extorted funds for the PLO. Saleem glosses over his connection with the 
American company and we are left to wonder if he was a recruited 
intelligence agent without realizing who his true employer was.
In 1980, Saleem led a group that transported SA-7 surface to air missiles 
to Afghanistan. After managing narrow mountain trails, Saleem was 
shocked to find an American Special Forces team assisting the muja-
hideen to whom Saleem had brought the SA-7s. The account of Saleem's 
time in Afghanistan is instructive, especially the American attempt to 
recruit Saleem and his fear that his cohorts would suspect he had been 
pitched.
Saleem had no desire to work for Americans, however. Instead he entered 
the United States on a temporary visa in 1981, planning to do as much 
harm as possible. He was financed by the same Saudi prince who had sent 
him to Afghanistan. America's poor and criminal groups proved to be 
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fertile ground for recruiting. One of the most revealing accounts of the 
book is not a battle scene, of which there are several, but Saleem's secret 
to recruiting Americans to Islam: he fed them. "You would not believe 
how many people in these Bible belt neighborhoods simply wanted 
something to eat" (245). It gives one pause to ponder if the same tactics 
are more effective now than in the 1980s. In another case, a local thug he 
tried to recruit was left without his posse after being convicted. But 
Saleem visited him in jail before he was transferred to prison. Playing on 
the new convict's fear, Saleem provided a contact—a Muslim Brotherhood 
contact—who arranged for his safety in prison. Upon his release, the 
former neighborhood tough was a dedicated Muslim who promptly 
traveled to a Pakistani terror camp.
Just as Saleem had been easily recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood, he 
was able to recruit with the same inducements—personal safety and free-
dom from starvation. This is a powerful lesson and illustrates how The 
Blood of Lambs operates on two levels. It is an interesting primer for the 
uninitiated or poorly informed, but it is also excellent reading for intelli-
gence and counterterrorism professionals who can take away lessons 
about recruitment, tradecraft, and the power of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which remains very active recruiting in all Muslim countries and feeding 
its recruits to several radical organizations. Perhaps Saleem's lesson to the 
professionals is this: know your opponent because he is already here.
Steven O'Hern is the author of The Intelligence Wars: Lessons From 
Baghdad and is a retired member of the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations. He is a faculty member of Counter Threat Institute Inter-
national.
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Attaché Extraordinaire: Vernon A. Walters in Brazil. By Frank 
Márcio De Oliveira. Washington D.C.: National Defense 
Intelligence College Press, March 2009. ISBN: 978-1-932946-
22-2. Photographs. Bibliographic References. Footnotes. 
English and Portuguese. Pp. 196. Free download available at 
http://www.ndic.edu/press/13120.htm.
Within the known annals of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), few 
individuals loom as large (figuratively and literally) as Lieutenant General 
Vernon A. Walters. Although he is not well known outside of the defense 
IC in particular, Vernon Walters' career spanned decades of service both 
in and out of uniform, crossing many continents, often in Silent Missions 
(the title of his own 1978 autobiography), unbeknownst to the American 
public until well after the events unfolded.
In Attaché Extraordinaire, Frank Márcio De Oliveira, a retired Brazilian 
military police officer, and current research fellow at the National Defense 
Intelligence College, focuses on those segments of Walters' life and career 
that involved his service in Brazil. De Oliveira traces Walters' early mili-
tary career, where as a first lieutenant during World War II, he was 
assigned as a liaison officer to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy 
due to his extraordinary ability to learn languages. Walters not only 
learned to speak Portuguese, he also gained the respect and admiration of 
those Brazilian officers that he came to know and befriend, including 
General (and future President) Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco. It 
was during Walters's duties as U.S. Defense Attaché in Brazil in 1964 that 
a military junta, led by Castello Branco, came to power. There were specu-
lations in the Brazilian press that the U.S. Government was behind the 
coup, noting Walters' access to the coup leader, but Walters maintained 
throughout his lifetime that neither he nor the U.S. Government played a 
role in encouraging the Brazilian military action.
Walters went on to a successful military career, serving in various diplo-
matic and intelligence positions with significant strategic security impli-
cations. De Oliveira makes a case that Walters, as a true "wordsmith," 
embodied the tools of argumentation and persuasion that allowed him to 
be a "connector" between hard and soft powers, a rare synergy of soldier-
statesman. In the book's main shortcoming, De Oliveira attempts to 
stretch the analogy by attempting to show parallels between the careers of 
Walters and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who also was in 
military intelligence during World War II. Whereas Kissinger was to make 
his name known in academic circles that parleyed into a high-profile dip-
lomatic career, Walters was content to be a soldier who maintained a 
much lower profile.
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The strength of De Oliveira's text is the rich insight it provides on Walters' 
influence in Brazil and his continuing legacy in that country. Quoting 
General Alexander Haig's eulogy at Walters' internment at Arlington 
National Cemetery in 2002, De Oliveira notes the strategic intelligence 
implications of Walters' influence in Brazil as "both an observer and 
someone who shaped history." Walters' ability to understand Brazil—not 
just its language, history, and culture but its strategic significance and 
importance the nation would come to play in the Western Hemisphere as 
a rising power—and cultivate relationships with key leaders, garnered 
him high respect and public honors from the Brazilian people.
As a former U.S. Army Latin American Foreign Area Officer (FAO), 
myself, I always admired General Walters as someone who embodied the 
spirit of the true strategic scout, the epitome of a successful FAO, who 
embodied the ability to empathize with his host country's counterparts 
and gain their respect and trust, yet without going native and forgetting 
for whom he worked. He also took seriously the responsibility to mentor 
the next generation of FAOs, as noted by one of his young charges, then 
Major Clarke Brintnall, who commented accurately (still to this day): 
"Young captain Foreign Area Officers had no status in the Embassy, but 
he [Walters] made sure that we were all brought into the full activities of 
the Army Attaché Office, soon thereafter the Defense Attaché Officer, and 
that all of us received the benefit of his experience."
Attaché Extraordinaire offers readers an important look into the life of 
one of the nation's best strategic thinkers from a foreign perspective. De 
Oliveira is clearly a product of Brazilian military heritage, where Walters' 
legacy looms large, yet he is still able to assess the broader strategic impli-
cations of Walters' role in Brazil and does not shy away from the more 
controversial aspects of Walters' influence. At one point in the text, he 
admits that we may never know the true extent of Walters' personal 
involvement in the events leading up to the military coup of 1964, and 
that there are two very different views ("protective angel of the coup" or 
"devoted friend of Brazil"). Yet, given Walters' strong Catholic faith and 
"missionary" zeal in service to his nation, he would likely see the two as 
non-exclusive.
Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. is a professor of International Studies and Political 
Science at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA.
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